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THE FREQUENTLY MISCHARACTERIZED
IMPACT OF THE COURTS ON THE FEC AND
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
Trevor Potter & Kirk L. Jowers'
Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or "Commission") apologists
frequently blame the courts for imposing an unyielding legal structure on
the FEC's ability to enforce campaign finance laws and regulations. One
of these critics of the federal judiciary's approach has gone so far as to
argue that the FEC has become a "toothless tiger" not because of its own
shortcomings, but because the courts, case by case, have painstakingly
pulled out every last tooth.'
This Article will demonstrate that while the courts may well have
limited the FEC's ability to enforce spending restrictions and disclosure
requirements regarding so-called "express advocacy," the Commission's
other failures cannot fairly be laid at the courthouse doors. Likewise, the
Supreme Court is not likely to invalidate key provisions of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Contrary to popular belief, courts have
been largely accommodating to campaign finance legislation and
enforcement. The more serious problem facing current and potential
campaign finance laws is the FEC's poor record of enforcing existing law,
and the likelihood that it will fail just as poorly at implementing recent
reforms.
I. THE FEC HAS A WINNING RECORD IN THE SUPREME COURT
The FEC constantly loses. I have never seen a record like this
outside of the old Chicago Cubs. I mean every time, it is like they
march up the hill like Pickett's charge, and they get slaughtered at
the district court level.
2
'Trevor Potter is General Counsel and Kirk L. Jowers is Director of Academic Affairs
and Deputy General Counsel of the Campaign and Media Legal Center. Messrs. Potter
and Jowers also are attorneys of the law firm Caplin & Drysdale in Washington, D.C. Mr.
Potter previously served as a Commissioner and as the Chairman of the Federal Election
Commission. Mr. Jowers previously served as General Counsel to the Washington, D.C.
Republican Party.
1. 135 Cong. Rec. 21,329 (1989) (statement of Sen. Reid).
2. John Fund, From The Ground Up: Local Lessons For National Reform, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 5,45 (1999).
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The FEC often fails in its attempts to enforce the campaign finance
laws.3 This perception is largely drawn from its usually-futile battles over
express advocacy. In fact, however, in the six most relevant Supreme
Court battles since the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA" or the
"Act") 4 was passed, the Court has upheld most, if not all, of the
challenged law.5
A. Buckley v. Valeo: Mixed Result
In 1971 and 1974, Congress wrote its first comprehensive federal
campaign finance law broadly to cover all money spent "in connection
with" or "for the purpose of influencing" federal elections.6 Less than
two years after FECA was passed and before the law even took effect,
the Supreme Court upheld parts of the statute, while narrowing its scope,
in Buckley v. Valeo.
In Buckley, the Court struck down several FECA provisions as
unconstitutional restraints of protected free speech rights.' Specifically,
the Court held invalid the Act's limits on individual, candidate, and
political action committee (PAC) expenditures because they did not
serve a government interest strong enough to justify abridging First
Amendment rights.'
What is sometimes ignored, however, is that the Buckley Court also
upheld substantial portions of the law. Moreover, those portions worked
reasonably well for almost two decades and remain valid today. The
justices held that FECA's contribution limits to candidates, PACs, and
political parties were constitutional because they served the "weighty"
government interests of preventing both the appearance and reality of
government corruption."
Also, in order to avoid striking down the source restrictions and
disclosure requirements for independent campaign expenditures in the
Act, the Court supplied its own narrowing, "saving" definition. The
3. See id.
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (2000).
5. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238 (1986); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996); Nixon v. Shrink Miss.
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533
U.S. 431 (2001).
6. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455.
7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
8. Id. at 45, 51, 55, 58.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 25-29, 58.
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justices held that only independent expenditures that constituted
"express advocacy" could be regulated." The Court then gave additional
content to this definition by listing several "magic words" and phrases -
"vote for," "vote against" and "support," for example - that definitively
constituted express advocacy. 2 The Buckley Court made clear that
independent expenditures, as redefined by the Court, could be regulated
without unduly burdening First Amendment values.13
B. Massachusetts Citizens For Life: A Victory
Ten years after the Supreme Court enunciated the express advocacy
test in Buckley, the Court applied it to an actual campaign
communication in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.
(MCFL).' 4 MCFL was a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized to
advance anti-abortion goals, 5 which published a special edition of its
standard newsletter weeks before the primary election. 6 While prior
newsletters had been sent to two or three thousand people, MCFL
published more than 100 thousand copies of this special edition. 7 The
front page of the publication featured the headline "EVERYTHING
YOU NEED TO KNOW TO VOTE PRO-LIFE."'8  Readers were
reminded that "[n]o pro-life candidate can win in November without
your vote in September."' 9 "VOTE PRO-LIFE" appeared in large black
letters on the back page,2° and the publication also provided a coupon
that readers could take to the polls to remind them of the names of pro-
life candidates.2'
The FEC alleged that MCFL's expenditures in financing the special
election newsletter were express advocacy and therefore constituted an
illegal corporate contribution." The Court agreed, reasoning that the
MCFL newsletter was express advocacy because it urged readers to
"vote for 'pro-life' candidates," '' and provided the names and
11. Id. at44.
12. Id. at 44 n.52.
13. Id.
14. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
15. Id. at 241-42.






22. Id. at 244.
23. Id. at 249.
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photographs of candidates who met that description.24  Thus, the
newsletter "provides, in effect an explicit directive: vote for these
(named) candidates. The fact that this message is marginally less direct
than 'Vote for Smith' does not change its essential nature."
'
Accordingly, the Court upheld the FEC contention that these
expenditures could be regulated as express advocacy.26
C. Austin: A Victory
In Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,7 the Court
affirmed the constitutionality of a ban on campaign spending by business
corporations and corporations other than purely non-profit
corporations. The Court considered a Michigan statute that prevented
corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent
expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in an
election for state office." An "independent" expenditure was defined as
one not made at the direction or under the control of another person, or
to a committee working for or against a particular candidate. 3° The
statute only allowed corporations to make such independent
expenditures from segregated funds used solely for political purposes.'
The statute was challenged by the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a
24. Id.
25. Id. at 249.
26. Because the Court found the MCFL newsletter to be express advocacy, it ruled
that MCFL's expenditures violated the Act. 1d. at 249-50. The Court then ruled that the
ban on federal election expenditures by corporate entities was unconstitutional as applied
to small issue-oriented organizations such as MCFL, and other 501(c)(4)-type
organizations that are not themselves funded by for-profit corporations, and for which
establishing a PAC would be a significant burden. Id. at 263-69. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court first noted that the expenditures were made independent of any
candidate. Id. at 251 ("[I]ndependent expenditures 'produce speech at the core of the
First Amendment."') (quoting FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470
U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (NCPAC); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976)
(invalidating $1,000 limit on independent individual expenditures). Second, the Court
relied on several institutional aspects of the MCFL decision that differentiated the
organization from most corporations. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 264. These aspects included the
fact that MCFL: (1) "was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and
cannot engage in business activities"; (2) "has no shareholders or other persons affiliated
so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings"; and (3) "was not established by a business
corporation or a labor union, and [has a] policy not to accept contributions from such
entities." Id.
27. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
2& Id. at 655.
29. Id. at 654.
30. Id. at 655.
31. Id. at 654-55.
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non-profit corporation with 8,000 members, seventy-five percent of
whom were for-profit corporations.32 The Chamber maintained a
segregated political fund, but sought to use funds from its general
treasury, which was funded through annual dues required of all of its
members, to promote the election or defeat of state candidates.33
Because many of the group's members were themselves for-profit
corporations, it was clear that the Chamber's contributions and
expenditures were coming from corporations, albeit indirectly.
4
The Court held that Michigan could restrict political contributions and
expenditures from non-profit corporate treasuries, at least under certain
circumstances. It did so on the grounds that permitting such a group to
participate in candidate elections would invite evasion of the ban on
spending by business corporations in such elections, allowing non-profit
groups to "serve as conduits for the type of direct spending that creates a
threat to the political marketplace." 6
D. Colorado Republicans I. A Loss
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC7
(Colorado Republicans I), the Court rejected the FEC's position that the
government could constitutionally limit independent expenditures by
political parties for their candidates.3" However, the Court was split over
the question of whether party coordinated expenditures could be
constitutionally limited.39 Four justices decided that the limits were
unconstitutional,4° while two justices approved of the limits.41 Justices
Breyer, Souter, and O'Connor, however, sought further information and
the case was accordingly remanded to the lower court 42 for further fact-
finding on the coordinated spending issue in Colorado Republican H.
32. Id. at 656.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 655.
36. Id. at 664 (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. 238,264 (1986)).
37. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
38. Id. at 608.
39. See id. at 626-31 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
40. Id. at 648-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 624-26.
42. Id.
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E. Shrink Missouri: A Victory
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PA C43 (Shrink PAC), the
Supreme Court upheld a Missouri law limiting contributions ranging
from $275 to $1,075. 4A The Court reaffirmed that a lower standard of
scrutiny applies to contribution limits than to restrictions on independent
expenditure limits.4 5  In an opinion reviving the "anti-corruption"
language used in the Buckley decision twenty-five years earlier, Justice
Souter's majority opinion discussed the "threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors." 6  Justice Souter
referred to Buckley's reasoning, insisting that to "[l]eave the perception
of impropriety unanswered, and the cynical assumption that large donors
call the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in
democratic governance." 47 Democracy, the Court reasoned, works "only
if the people have faith in those who govern, and that faith is bound to be
shattered when high officials and their appointees engage in activities
which arouse suspicion of malfeasance and corruption.
' 8
F Colorado I: A Victory
In FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee49
(Colorado Republicans II), the FEC prevailed when the Supreme Court
upheld FECA's party spending limit, which limits how much political
parties can spend on behalf of and in tandem with their congressional
candidates. ° The Court found the limits to be fully justified and
constitutional under the anti-corruption rationale of Buckley because
they served to combat circumvention of the limits on contributions that
donors can make directly to candidates.5
II. WINNING IN COURT? DEPENDS ON THE ISSUE AND EFFORT
In striking down expenditure limits,52 upholding contribution limits,53
and reinterpreting the reporting and disclosure requirements,54 Buckley
43. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
44. Id. at 397-98.
45. Id. at 387-88.
46. Id. at 389.
47. Id. at 389-90.
48. Id. at 390 (citing United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562
(1961)).
49. 533 U.S. 431 (2001)
50. Id. at 465.
51. Id. at 464-65.
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,39-51 (1976).
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presented a paradigmatic example of the problem that would vex efforts
to enforce campaign finance laws for decades. That problem is the
interplay of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, two modes of
analysis courts employ when considering whether speech regulations in
general, and campaign finance laws in particular, have the requisite
specificity to avoid constitutional problems. For a campaign finance
reform measure to survive vagueness and overbreadth challenges, it must
provide a clear, bright-line standard - one that is sufficiently narrow to
avoid regulating too much speech or political activity, and sufficiently
precise to give proper notice of what activity is regulated. As a concrete
example, courts have been reluctant to allow regulation of election ads
that do not meet the magic words because such regulatory attempts have
the potential to chill constitutionally protected speech.57 Accordingly,
lower courts have routinely thwarted the FEC's and reformers' efforts to
combat "sham" issue advocacy. On the other hand, courts have been
overwhelmingly deferential to laws governing disclosure and
contribution limits because they clearly and specifically target the
conduct to be regulated - an easier goal to achieve than in the area of
advocacy.
A. Express Advocacy
The Supreme Court has historically treated regulations of "pure"
political speech with extreme skepticism. The justices made note of the
myriad decisions manifesting this skepticism in Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Committee,59 when it addressed a state's
53. Id. at 24-35.
54. Id. at 60-84.
55. Id. at 61, 76-79, 82.
56. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22-23.
57. See, e.g., Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D. Me. 1996)
(stating how the Supreme Court "err[ed] on the side of permitting things that affect the
election process, but at all costs avoid[ed] restricting, in any way, discussion of public
issues"), affd, 98 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1996)
58. See, e.g., Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991); Vt. Right to Life, Inc. v.
Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 379-80, 386-89 (2d Cir. 2000); Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155, 161-62
(4th Cir. 2000); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 713, 718 (4th Cir. 1999);
FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997); Iowa Right to Life
Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969-70 (8th Cir. 1999); Citizens for Responsible Gov't v.
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000); Fla. Right to Life v. Lamar, 238 F.3d 1288,
1289 (11th Cir. 2001); Me. Right to Life, 914 F. Supp. at 12.
59. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
2002]
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prohibition on primary endorsements by political parties.0 The Court
maintained that:
The ban directly affects speech which "is at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms."
Williams v. Rhodes, [393 U.S. 23 (1968)]. We have recognized
repeatedly that "debate on the qualifications of candidates [is]
integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
14 (1976) (per curiam); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467
(1980); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
Indeed, the First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent
application" to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); see
also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1996). Free discussion
about candidates for public office . . . "is a means of
disseminating ideas as well as attaining political office." Illinois
Bd. of Elections [v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186
(1979)].61
Likewise, Buckley reminded us that the discussion of public issues is
integral to the functioning of a healthy democratic government. 2 The
Court further proclaimed that "[t]he First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the]
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."' 63 The reluctance of the federal
courts to restrict campaign speech is thus unclear absent a compelling
countervailing governmental interest to the nation's political health.
1. Buckley v. Valeo: The Creation of the Distinction Between "Express"
and "Issue" Advocacy
Buckley began its analysis with the finding that all regulations
impinging upon political expression burden "core First Amendment
rights of political expression." ' Any restriction of such core speech
must, therefore, satisfy the highly demanding standard applicable to
statutes that transgress fundamental Constitutional values.6 To
60. Id. at 216.
61. Id. at 222-23.
62. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976).
63. Id. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
64. Id. at 45.
65. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
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withstand this so-called "strict scrutiny," a law must be narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling governmental interest.66
Despite this rigorous standard, Buckley permitted regulation of
campaign-related communications and expenditures involving express
advocacy, but granted independent issue advocacy full freedom from
government regulation.67 The Buckley opinion essentially established a
three-tiered structure for regulating campaign expenditures. First, limits
and prohibitions may constitutionally be placed on coordinated
expenditures and contributions.68  Second, disclosure and reporting
requirements may be imposed on independent expenditures. 69 But third,
the attempted regulation of all speech that was "in connection with" or
"for the purpose of influencing" a federal election, is unconstitutionally
broad and vague.7°
Buckley drew a bright line limiting government regulation of political
speech to express advocacy of "the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office."7 The Court theorized (without
reference to any particular ad, and without a record in the case of the
standards as applied) that a strict approach was necessary because "the
distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of
election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical
application."72
The Buckley Court then discussed express advocacy in two different
contexts. First, the Court struck down FECA's $1,000 individual
expenditure limit,73 reasoning that because the discussion of political
issues is so closely linked to the discussion of political candidates, the
Act's expenditure limits that related to "clearly identified candidates"
were unconstitutionally vague.74 The Court feared that the expenditure
limits would be applied to constrain constitutionally protected political
issue discussions." The Court held that in order to avoid fatal vagueness,
the Act "must be construed to apply only to expenditures for
66. Id.
67. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22-23.
68. Id. at 13.
69. Id. at 64.
70. Id. at 39-60.
71. Id. at 44.
72. Id. at 42.
73. Id. at 51.
74. Id. at 39-43.
75. Id. at 41-42 (noting that the court of appeals erred by thinking that the statute's
construction completely eliminated vagueness).
2002]
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communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of
a clearly identified candidate for federal office."76
Second, the Buckley Court discussed express advocacy in the context
of FECA's reporting and disclosure provisions. 7 The Court found these
requirements vague, predicting that they could unconstitutionally chill
issue discussion when applied to every person who made a contribution
or "expenditure for the purpose of influencing a federal election., 78 The
Court remedied this problem by again limiting FECA's reporting and
disclosure requirements to communications "that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.
79
2. The Legacy of Buckley's Express Advocacy Standard
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the utility of the express advocacy
requirement in MCFL.i' There, the justices declared that Buckley
"adopted the 'express advocacy' requirement to distinguish discussion of
issues and candidates from more pointed exhortations to vote for
particular persons."8' The Court then held that the statute at issue in
MCFL could only be constitutional if its reach was limited to express
advocacy." However, the Court broadened - if only slightly - the
Buckley definition of express advocacy to include words which are "in
effect" an explicit directive "marginally less direct" than the Buckley
language."' As a result, the FEC has successfully deployed MCFL in
court pleadings to justify a definition of express advocacy based, at least
in part, on the implied electoral meanings of phrases in ads.f
In FEC v. Furgatch,85 the Ninth Circuit took a different - and more
expansive - approach to express advocacy. 6 The panel held that an
76. Id. at 44.
77. Id. at 75-84.
78. Id. at 76-82 (discussing and recognizing the statute's serious problems of
vagueness).
79. Id. at 80.
80. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
81. Id. at 249.
82. Id. at 251; see also West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F. Supp. 1036, 1039
(S.D.W. Va. 1996) ("It is clear from the holdings in Buckley and its progeny that the
Supreme Court has made a definite distinction between express advocacy, which generally
can be regulated, and issue advocacy, which generally cannot be regulated.").
83. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249 (concluding that the MCFL publication provides "in effect
an explicit directive: vote for these (named) candidates"); see also id. (acknowledging that
the electoral message in MCFL is "marginally less direct than 'Vote for Smith' [and the
other terms identified in Buckley]").
84. FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
85. 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987).
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advertisement lacking "magic words" may be express advocacy and
therefore could be regulated under the Act."7 To reach that conclusion,
the court interpreted Buckley's express advocacy test as not requiring "a
bright and unambiguous line,"' and expressly rejected the notion that
express advocacy is limited to communications containing the specific
terms identified by Buckley.89 The Supreme Court denied a certorari
petition in Furgatch.
The FEC's apparent victory in Furgatch, however, was short-lived.
Other federal appeals courts that have since considered the question -
including the First, Second, Fourth, Eight, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits -
have held that the Buckley express advocacy test can only be met by
communications that contain explicit and unambiguous words urging
readers to elect or defeat a clearly identified candidate. 90 These courts
86. Id. at 861-63.
87. Id. at 862-63.
88. Id. at 861.
89. Id. at 862-63.
90. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 249 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)); see,
e.g., Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468 (1st Cir. 1991); Vt. Right to Life, Inc. v. Sorrell, 221
F.3d 376, 379-80, 386-89 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing a lower court decision which upheld a
Vermont law that required individuals and organizations who run advertisements
"expressly or implicitly advocat[ing] the success or defeat of a candidate" to identify the
name and address of the buyer of the advertisement because it unconstitutionally limited
issue advocacy in violation of Buckley's bright-line test); Perry v. Bartlett, 231 F.3d 155,
161-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding a disclosure statute requiring the sponsors of political
advertisements that intended to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate to be
unconstitutionally overbroad because the statute would allow regulation beyond the
bright-line rule of express advocacy established by Buckley); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v.
Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 713, 718 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding a statute unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad because it encompassed entities engaging in issue advocacy and did not
limit its coverage to entities engaging in express advocacy); FEC v. Christian Action
Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997); Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d
963, 969 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding a state disclosure statute modeled on the Furgatch
standard to be in violation of the Buckley bright-line test); Citizens for Responsible Gov't
v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1194 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying a bright-line view of what
constitutes express advocacy and then finding the Colorado law's definitions of
independent expenditure, political committee, and political message to be unconstitutional
because they extended the reach of the Act's "substantive provisions 'to advocacy with
respect to public issues, which is a violation of the rule enunciated in Buckley and its
progeny"'); Fla. Right to Life v. Lamar, 238 F.3d 1288, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) (striking
down Florida's definition of "political committee" as unconstitutionally overbroad
because it swept within its regulatory ambit groups whose primary purpose is to engage in
issue advocacy); see also FEC v. Cent. Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616
F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that section 441d of the FECA "clearly establish[es]
that, contrary to the position of the FEC, the words 'expressly advocating' mean[] exactly
what they say"); Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D. Me.), affid,
98 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that "[t]he [Supreme] Court seems to have been quite
serious in limiting FEC enforcement to express advocacy with examples of words that
20021
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have rejected attempts to find express advocacy based on implied
electoral meanings, even if the implicit electoral message is clear and,
arguably, unmistakable.9' In several cases, courts have done so even as
they directly acknowledged that the implied advocacy standard would
effectively exempt much candidate-related political speech intended to
affect the outcome of federal elections from the disclosure requirements
and restrictions on corporate and labor funding of the federal election
laws."
Nevertheless, these courts have indicated that they do not believe that
Buckley provides any leeway for lower courts to regulate such speech,
and so they feel compelled to "err on the side of permitting things that
affect the election process, but at all costs avoid[] restricting, in any way,
discussion of public issues."93 While federal district and state courts that
have addressed state laws regulating issue advocacy have not been nearly
as uniform in their approach, they have nevertheless been fairly
unyielding.9'
directly fit that term"); Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248,
250 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing with approval the approach of the First and Fourth Circuits in
ruling that the FEC's definition of express advocacy was impermissible). But see FEC v.
Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) (permitting some reference to outside
circumstances in evaluating whether words constitute express advocacy).
91. See supra note 83.
92. See, e.g., Me. Right to Life, 914 F. Supp. at 12.
93. Id.
94. Compare Kansans for Life, Inc. v. Gaede, 38 F. Supp. 2d. 928, 936-37 (D. Kan.
1999) (finding that the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission's definition of express
advocacy - "[a] communication which, when viewed as a whole, leads an ordinary person
to believe that he or she is being urged to vote for or against a particular candidate for
office" - was unconstitutionally vague), and Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich., Inc.
v. Miller, 21 F. Supp. 2d 740, 741, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (finding a state rule "prohibiting
the use of a candidate's name or likeness in communications made by a corporation forty-
five days prior to an election" as "overbroad and [likely to] chill the exercise of
constitutionally protected 'issue advocacy"'), and Right to Life of Mich., Inc. v. Miller, 23
F. Supp. 2d 766, 771 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (same), and Stenson v. McLaughlin, No. 00-514-
JD, 2001 WL 1033614 (D.N.H. Aug. 24, 2001) (striking part of a statute regulating
"implicit advocacy" because it was too vague and went "beyond the express advocacy
limitations of Buckley"), and Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 814,
817 (Va. 1998) (narrowing "the broad sweep of the phrase 'for the purpose of influencing'
... so as to have no application to individuals or groups that engage solely in issue
advocacy"), and Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (D. Vt.
1998) (narrowly construing the term "political advertisements," as used in statutes, to
mean express advocacy communications because "[i]f the Vermont legislature intended to
regulate communications that impliedly advocate for or against a candidate, it has flouted
the United States Supreme Court's holdings in Buckley and MCFL..."), with Chamber of
Commerce v. Moore, 191 F.Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (rejecting the Chamber's
request that the court declare that it could broadcast certain issue ads without being
subject to contribution limits and disclosure and reporting requirements), and Oregon ex
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3. The FEC's Response
In the wake of these Supreme Court and lower federal court rulings, in
1995, the FEC promulgated two new provisions to define what kinds of
communications constitute express advocacy.95  The first provision -
part (a) - includes all of the express advocacy terms the Supreme Court
identified in Buckley and thereby incorporates the Court's definition into
the FEC's regulations, while broadening that definition somewhat. 96 The
second provision - part (b) - has become known as the "reasonable
person" definition, and is a clear attempt to incorporate an expansive
reading of the more flexible Ninth Circuit express advocacy standard
from Furgatch97 into the FEC's regulations (which are, of course, in effect
throughout the country).
rel. Crumpton v. Keisling, 982 P.2d 3, 10 (Or. 1999) ("The purpose is not to search for
magic words - which careful drafters can, as in this case, usually avoid - but to find the
essential message that the publication communicates to the reader."), and Osterberg v.
Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 52-54 (Tex. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1244 (2000) (adopting a broad
view of express advocacy based on MCFL to find that an advertisement was subject to
disclosure requirements), and Election Bd. of Wisc. v. Wisc. Mfrs. & Commerce, 597
N.W.2d 721, 733, 739 (Wis. 1999) (ruling that it may be appropriate for a court to rely on
implications that are made clear by the context of speech, but electing not to apply that
standard in this case because defendants had not been given fair advance notice).
95. 11 C.F.R. § 100.22 (2000). The regulation states:
Expressly advocating means any communication that -
(a) Uses phrases such as "vote for the President," "re-elect your Congressman,"
"support the Democratic nominee," "cast your ballot for the Republican
challenger for U.S. Senate in Georgia," "Smith for Congress," "Bill McKay in
'94," "vote Pro-Life," or "vote Pro-Choice" accompanied by a listing of clearly
identified candidates described as Pro-Life or Pro-Choice, "vote against Old
Hickory," "defeat" accompanied by a picture of one or more candidate(s),
"reject the incumbent," or communications of campaign slogan(s) or individual
word(s), which in context can have no other reasonable meaning than to urge the
election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s), such as posters,
bumper stickers, advertisements, etc. which say "Nixon's the One," "Carter '76,"
"Reagan/Bush," or "Mondale!"; or
(b) When taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events, such as
the proximity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as
containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified
candidate(s) because -
(1) The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous,
and suggestive of only one meaning; and
(2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it encourages actions to
elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s) or encourages some
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Part (b) was promptly and successfully challenged in the First Circuit.
In Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. FEC,9 the district court found
the provision unconstitutional on its face, regardless of how it might be
applied.' The First Circuit summarily affirmed the district court's
decision on appeal.""' Since then, the FEC has been enjoined from
enforcing this part of its regulations in the First Circuit.'0 ' The Second
and Fourth Circuits' precedents indicate that they would deem part (b)
of the FEC's express advocacy regulations unconstitutional as well.""°
Maine Right to Life made clear that the FEC is not the only entity
restricted by the Buckley express advocacy standard."3 While the district
court judge acknowledged that the ruling restricted the scope of the
federal election laws and left much election-related speech unregulated,
the court stressed that its decision was controlled by Supreme Court
precedent:
If the Supreme Court had not decided Buckley and [MCFL]
and if the First Circuit had not decided Faucher, I might well
uphold the FEC's subpart (b) definition of what should be
covered. After all, the Federal Election Campaign Act is
designed to avoid excessive corporate financial interference in
elections and the FEC presumably has some expertise on the
question of what form that interference may take based on its
history of complaints, investigations and enforcement actions.
98. 914 F. Supp. 8 (D. Me. 1996), affd, 98 F.2d 1 (1 st Cir. 1996).
99. Id. at 13.
100. 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
101. See Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 254
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). Subsection (b) was enjoined nationwide in Va. Society for Human Life,
Inc. v. FEC, 83 F. Supp. 2d 668, 677 (E.D. Va. 2000), rev'd, 263 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Fourth Circuit recently overturned the district court's nationwide injunction on the
FEC's express advocacy rule, however, finding that the district court abused its authority
by issuing a nationwide injunction and noting that such an "injunction ... encroaches on
the ability of other circuits to consider the constitutionality of" the FEC's express
advocacy regulations. Va. Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v. FEC, 263 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir.
2001). The court upheld the injunction, however, as applied to the pro-life organization
that brought the law suit and concluded that the regulation violated the First Amendment
because it is not limited to communications that contain express words of advocacy as
required by Buckley v. Valeo. Id. at 392. The court explained that the regulation violates
Buckley's and MCFL's prohibition that the government may not define "express advocacy
with reference to the reasonable listener's or reader's overall impression of the
communication." Id. Thus, "[t]he regulation goes too far because it shifts the
determination of what is 'express advocacy' away from the words 'in and of themselves' to
'the unpredictability of audience interpretation."' Id.
102. See, e.g., FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d
45, 52 (2d Cir. 1980); FEC v. Christian Action Network, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996).
103. Me. Right to Life, 914 F. Supp. at 11-12.
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But there is another policy at issue here and it is one that I
believe the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have used to
trump all the arguments suggested above. Specifically, the
Supreme Court has been most concerned not to permit
intrusion upon "issue" advocacy - discussion of the issues on
the public's mind from time to time or of the candidate's
positions on such issues - that the Supreme Court has
considered a special concern of the First Amendment ....
What the Supreme Court did was draw a bright line that may
err on the side of permitting things that affect the election
process, but at all costs avoids restricting, in any way, discussion
of public issues. The Court seems to have been quite serious in
limiting FEC enforcement to express advocacy.'"
The district court also highlighted the tensions between the purposes of
the election laws - which had been repeatedly sanctioned by the
Supreme Court - and the Court's demanding express advocacy test:
The advantage of this . . . [strict] approach, from a First
Amendment point of view, is that it permits a speaker or writer
to know from the outset exactly what is permitted and what is
prohibited. In the stressful context of public discussions with
deadlines, bright lights and cameras, the speaker need not pause
to debate the shades of meaning in language. The result is not
very satisfying from a realistic communications point of view
and does not give much recognition to the policy of the election
statute to keep corporate money from influencing elections in
this way, but it does recognize the First Amendment interest as
the Court has defined it." 5
As recently as April of 2002, courts were rejecting challenges to express
advocacy communications despite compelling facts because they felt
constrained by Buckley. Thus, in Chamber of Commerce v. Moore,1°  the
Fifth Circuit explicitly acknowledged "that the result we reach in this
104. Id.
105. Id. at 12. The court stated:
The advantage of this rigid approach, from a First Amendment point of view, is
that it permits a speaker or writer to know from the outset exactly what is
permitted and what is prohibited. In the stressful context of public discussions
with deadlines, bright lights and cameras, the speaker need not pause to debate
the shades of meaning in language. The result is not very satisfying from a
realistic communications point of view and does not give much recognition to the
policy of the election statute to keep corporate money from influencing elections
in this way, but it does recognize the First Amendment interest as the Court has
defined it.
Id.
106. No. 00-60779, 2002 WL 518638 (5th Cir. Apr. 5, 2002).
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case may be counterintuitive to a common sense understanding of the
message conveyed by the television political advertisements at issue. ' '
The FEC has never withdrawn the "reasonable person" express
advocacy definition contained in its part (b) reform, despite court
decisions proclaiming it unenforceable."" However, the Commission has
become extremely passive in its defense of that definition after the
pounding the agency took in the 1997 case FEC v. Christian Action
Network.'9
In Christian Action Network, the district court adopted,"0 and the
Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed,"' a strict definition of "express
advocacy." The basis of the case occurred during the weeks immediately
prior to the 1992 presidential election. The Christian Action Network
(CAN) aired television advertisements criticizing the alleged "militant
homosexual agenda" of the Clinton/Gore ticket."
2
The FEC argued that any viewer would understand that the
advertisement advocated Clinton's defeat, and that the use of images and
music made communication a classic negative advertisement."3 For
107. Id. at *9.
108. In 1998, the FEC declined a petition to initiate a rulemaking to rescind its
definition. 63 Fed. Reg. 8363 (Feb. 19, 1998) (citing Supreme Court cases including
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1984), which state approval of the
standard agency practice of seeking review in several circuits to facilitate Supreme Court
resolution of difficult issues).
109. 110 F.3d 1049, 1050 (4th Cir. 1997).
110. FECv. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 957 (W.D. Va. 1995).
111. FECv. Christian Action Network, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996).
112. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. at 948. The district court's opinion
describes the advertisement as opening:
[W]ith a full-color picture of candidate Bill Clinton's face superimposed upon an
American flag, which is blowing in the wind. Clinton is shown smiling and the ad
appears to be complimentary. However, as the narrator begins to describe
Clinton's alleged support for "radical" homosexual causes, Clinton's image
dissolves into a black and white photographic negative. The negative darkens
Clinton's eyes and mouth, giving the candidate a sinister and threatening
appearance . . . . Simultaneously, the music accompanying the commercial
changes from a single high pitched tone to a lower octave. The commercial then
presents a series of pictures depicting advocates of homosexual rights, apparently
gay men and lesbians, demonstrating at a political march ....
As the scenes from the march continue, the narrator asks in rhetorical
fashion, "Is this your vision for a better America?" Thereafter, the image of the
American flag reappears on the screen, but without the superimposed image of
candidate Clinton. At the same time, the music changes back to the single high
pitched tone. The narrator then states, "[f]or more information on traditional
family values, contact the Christian Action Network."
Id. at 948-49 (internal citations omitted).
113. Id. at 956.
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instance, the agency contended that the commercial sent an explicit anti-
Clinton message: "By graphically removing Clinton's superimposed
image from the presidential setting of the American flag, the
advertisement visually conveys the message that Clinton should not
become President. [It] is a powerful visual image telling voters to defeat
Clinton., 114 The FEC also addressed other aspects of the commercial,
including:
(1) the visual degrading of candidate Clinton's picture into a
black and white negative; (2) the use of visual text and audio
voice-overs; (3) ominous music; (4) unfavorable coloring; (5)
codewords such as "vision" and "quota;" (6) issues raised that
are relevant only if candidate Clinton became president; (7) the
airing of the commercial in close proximity to the national
election; and (8) abrupt editing linking Clinton to the images of
the gay rights marchers.
15
In striking down the FEC's arguments, the district and circuit courts
were not content to merely rule that the CAN advertisement was
constitutionally protected issue advocacy that could not be regulated.
116
Rather, after summarily affirming the district court's ruling,"17 the Fourth
Circuit awarded attorneys' fees and costs to CAN under the Equal
Access to Justice Act.18  In a blistering opinion highly critical of the
FEC's arguments, the Fourth Circuit found that the Commission's legal
position was, "if not assumed in bad faith, at least not 'substantially
justified.""' 9  The court ridiculed the FEC's contention that CAN's
advertisement could be express advocacy without specific "magic words":
114. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
115. Id. (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 953. The court stated:
Concededly, the advertisements "clearly identified" the 1992 Democratic
presidential and vice presidential candidates .... Similarly, it is beyond dispute
that the advertisements were openly hostile to the proposals believed to have
been endorsed by the two candidates. Nevertheless, the advertisements were
devoid of any language that directly exhorted the public to vote. Without a frank
admonition to take electoral action, even admittedly negative advertisements
such as these, do not constitute "express advocacy" as that term is defined in
Buckley and its progeny .... .. It is clear from the cases that expressions of
hostility to the positions of an official, implying that [the] official should not be
reelected - even when that implication is quite clear - do not constitute express
advocacy ....
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
117. FEC v. Christian Action Network, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996).
118. FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049, 1050 (4th Cir. 1997); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1994).
119. CAN, 110 F.3d at 1050.
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In the face of unequivocal Supreme Court and other authority
discussed, an argument such as that made by the FEC in this
case, that "no words of advocacy are necessary to expressly
advocate the election of a candidate," simply cannot be
advanced in good faith ... much less with "substantial
justification."... It may be that "[i]mages and symbols without
words can also convey unequivocal meaning synonymous with
literal text." It may well be that "[m]etaphorical and figurative
speech can be more pointed and compelling, and can thus more
successfully express advocacy, than a plain, literal
recommendation to 'vote' for a particular person[,]" and that "it
would indeed be perverse to require FECA regulation to turn
on the degree to which speech is literal or figurative, rather than
on the clarity of its message," "[g]iven that banal, literal
language often carries less force." It may even be, as the FEC
contends in this particular case, that "the combined message of
words and dramatic moving images, sounds, and other non-
verbal cues such as film editing, photographic techniques, and
music, involving highly charged rhetoric and provocative images
... taken as a whole[] sent an unmistakable message to oppose
[Governor Clinton]." But the Supreme Court has
unambiguously held that the First Amendment forbids the
regulation of our political speech under such indeterminate
standards. "Explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of
a candidate," "express words of advocacy," the Court has held,
are the constitutional minima. To allow the government's
power to be brought to bear on less, would effectively be to
dispossess corporate citizens of their fundamental right to
engage in the very kind of political issue advocacy the First
Amendment was intended to protect - as this case well
confirms.120
An infamous example of the sham ads produced in the 1996 election
cycle is an advertisement broadcast in Montana a few days before a
federal election by an out of state non-profit corporation. The
corporation appeared to be a shell entity used to funnel funds
anonymously into election campaigns in their closing days. The ad,
about a congressional candidate named Bill Yellowtail, said in its
entirety:
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but he took
a swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's response? He only
slapped her. But "her nose was broken." He talks law and
order.., but is himself a convicted felon. And though he talks
120. Id. at 1064 (internal citations omitted).
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about protecting children, Yellowtail failed to make his own
child support payments - then voted against child support
enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail. Tell him to support family
values.
1 21
The protection these and other courts have provided to issue advocacy
communications by independent advocacy groups has also led political
parties and candidates to become more dependent on issue-oriented
advertisements that they argue can be paid for by a mixture of federal
and not-federal funds. 12
The use of these sham "issue ads" reached their apogee in the elections
of 1996, and presented a particularly crucial test for the FEC.'
23
Beginning in the fall of 1995, President Clinton directed the Democratic
National Committee (DNC) to launch a $34 million dollar issue-ad
campaign designed to showcase the President's achievements in office.
24
The rationale for these ads was to provide a critical boost to the
President's relatively low public opinion numbers in advance of the
coming elections.1 2 As eventually became clear, Clinton's media
advisors understood not just the politics of the matter, but also the law.
A staffer later commented that he knew that he needed "to get around
the law .... If you changed a few words, then you could produce them
as D.N.C. ads and not as Clinton-Gore ads.' 26 Bob Dole and the GOP
121. U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Investigation of Illegal or
Improper Activities in Connection with the 1996 Federal Election Campaigns, S. Rep. No.
105-167, at 6304-05 (1998).
122. DEBORAH BECK ET AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996
CAMPAIGN 3 (1997). According to a study conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy
Center, "more than two dozen organizations engaged in issue advocacy during the 1995-
1996 election cycle, at an estimated total expense of $135 million to $150 million." Id. A
study of the 1999-2000 election cycle by the Annenberg Public Policy Center estimates
that more than $509 million was spent on issue advocacy. KATHLEEN HALL JAMISON ET
AL., ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING IN THE 1999-2000 ELECTION CYCLE 4 (2001).
Also, "[t]he Republican and Democratic parties accounted for almost $162 million (32%)
of this spending." Id.
123. Letter from Ann McBride, President, Common Cause, to Janet Reno, Attorney
General 36 (Oct. 9, 1996). The presidential campaigns' pervasive use of candidate-
centered issue advocacy during the 1996 campaign was not the only potential campaign
finance violation. Id. That election also witnessed the emergence of open, direct, and
continuous cooperation between the parties and the candidates in designing, targeting,
and funding the issue advertisements. Id.
124. Anthony Corrado, Giving, Spending, and "Soft Money," 6 J.L. & POL'Y 45, 51-53
(1997).
125. Id. at 51-52.
126. Jill Abramson & Leslie Wayne, Democrats Used the State Parties to Bypass
Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,1997, at Al.
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were quick to catch on and immediately began their own sham "issue-ad"
campaign, called, rather tellingly, the "Victory '96" program."'
Despite these apparent abuses, the FEC rejected recommendations by
its legal staff and voted unanimously against regulating the Clinton and
Dole advertisements, noting that no obvious standard existed under
current court precedent to define permissible legal standards for such
party advertisements.'2' Likewise, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno,
after much resistance, ultimately relented and conducted a preliminary
investigation based on the FEC's recommendation that the DNC ads
should be viewed as excessive, and therefore illegal, campaign activity.'2 9
After the preliminary investigation, Reno decided not to proceed further
with the matter.'3
Reno and the FEC were roundly criticized for caving in and not taking
on the parties for their 1996 abuses."' Regardless of whether they acted
in bad faith or good, however, both the Attorney General and the
Commission relied on the confusion in this area of law concerning party
funding issues. This confusion, which the FEC has done absolutely
nothing to alleviate since 1996, enabled the FEC and the Department of
Justice to avoid politically difficult decisions relating to 1996 party
activities.
127. Corrado, supra note 124, at 53. Senator Bob Dole, in commenting on a sixty-
second Republican National Committee (RNC) issue ad that never mentioned the
presidential election but devoted fifty-six seconds to his biography quipped that the ad
"never says that I'm running for President though I hope that's fairly obvious, since I'm
the only one in the picture." Adam Clymer, System Governing Election Spending Found
in Shambles, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,1996, at Al.
128. Roberto Suro, FEC Lets '96 Campaigns Off on "Issue Ads," WASH. POST, Dec.
11, 1998, at A21. Other organizations, such as the unions, industry groups, and other
advocacy groups seemed to cross over the issue advocacy line and into express advocacy
territory without incurring the FEC's wrath. Id.
129. Robert Suro & Michael Grunwald, Reno Sets 90-Day Clinton Probe, WASH.
POST, Sept. 9, 1998, at Al.
130. Suro, supra note 128.
131. See, e.g., Opinion, KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 12, 1998, at B6 (stating that "[tihe
FEC's misguided rejection of the recommendations of its staff carries serious
ramifications. It excuses flagrant misbehavior by the presidential campaigns .... [I]t has
shown again that it cannot be relied upon to enforce the rules that are in place");
Editorial, Making a Mockery of Campaign Spending Limits, NEWSDAY, Dec. 17, 1998, at
A54 (stating that "Washington has quietly dropped even the pretense of spending limits in
presidential campaigns . . . . Both recent decisions grew out of spurious issue
advertisements that actually promoted the candidacies of President Bill Clinton or
Republican challenger Bob Dole").
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B. Disclosure
Disclosure laws fall into two major categories: campaign finance
disclosure and campaign communication disclosure.3 2 Campaign finance
disclosure refers to reporting campaign contributions and spending;
campaign communication disclosure involves identifying communication
sponsors, often called source identification disclosure, or disclaimers. In
1971, Congress updated FECA and expanded the contribution and
expenditure disclosure requirements, giving the newly created FEC the
responsibility for collecting the data.'33 The 1974 Amendments to FECA
further strengthened the disclosure requirements and increased the
FEC's responsibilities'"4
The Supreme Court's disclosure jurisprudence is complex and
sometimes contradictory. This complexity arises because political
disclosure laws implicate core rights protected by the Constitution,
including free speech and association, but are necessary to facilitate an
informed electorate and a transparent and corruption-free government.1
35
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that while disclosure laws may
infringe on First Amendment freedoms, they also promote First
Amendment interests.
36
In short, disclosure laws governing campaign contributions and
spending have generally been held constitutional. 37 In a few specific
instances, however, certain disclosure requirements have been struck
132. At the federal and state levels, today's campaign disclosure framework has its
roots in disclosure laws enacted at the turn of the twentieth century, most specifically the
Publicity Act of 1910. For the most part, however, the early disclosure laws fell short of
their promise, and compliance by candidates and political committees, and enforcement
and administration by disclosure agencies, were poor at best. ROBERT E. MUTCH,
CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS AND COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LAW 26 (1988). Political scientist Louise Overacker described the state of the disclosure
program in the House Clerk's office in 1932 as: "one is taken into a tiny washroom, where
a series of dusty paper-covered bundles repose upon an upper shelf. By climbing upon a
chair and digging about among the bundles one usually finds what one wants.., but there
is no file and no system." Id.
133. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 101, 86 Stat. 3
(1972), as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §
101, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
134. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974). In the 2000 election cycle, the FEC received disclosure of $1 billion in transactions
from over one thousand filers, and entered 2,390,837 detailed records in its database, from
electronic filings alone. See Federal Election Commission, Annual Report 3-5 (2000).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 354 (1995).
137. See generally, Trevor Potter, Buckley v. Valeo, Political Disclosure and the First
Amendment, 33 AKRON L. REv. 71 (1999).
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down. Those instances have typically arisen in situations involving
"anonymous speech" and ballot initiatives;' where disclosure results in
severe administrative burdens, 39 or where disclosure exposes persons to
politically motivated threats, harassment, and reprisals.'"
1. Buckley v. Valeo
Like all courts considering First Amendment matters, the Buckley
Court began the disclosure analysis by determining what level of
constitutional "scrutiny" should apply to the FECA's disclosure
provisions. 4' Noting that "compelled disclosure, in itself can seriously
infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment,"'42 the Court applied what it termed "exacting scrutiny.'
4
The justices then held that the disclosure provisions would (1) have to be
justified by important public interests, and (2) have a "relevant
correlation" or "substantial relation" to the public interest being served.1"
Thus, the Buckley Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to the
FECA's disclosure provisions, as opposed to the higher standard of strict
scrutiny, which requires a statute to be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling state interest.
In applying this standard, the Buckley Court found that mandatory
campaign finance disclosure deters both actual and apparent
corruption.' The Court also noted that disclosure serves a related
interest by helping the FEC detect and prosecute contribution violations
under FECA. 47 Further, the justices recognized that beyond their anti-
corruption function, laws requiring disclosure provide valuable
information to voters and therefore strengthen the democratic process
itself.'4' Disclosure information, reasoned the Court, permits voters to
predict future performance in office by identifying the interests to which
13& See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
139. See FEC v. MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 255 (1986).
140. See FEC v. Socialist Workers Party '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 88 (1982).
141. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978). Recent cases are inconsistent in
establishing the level of scrutiny for analyzing disclosure statutes. In the most recent case,
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999), the Court
applied intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 204-05. In contrast, the Court applied exacting
scrutiny in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Board, 573 U.S. 347, 357 (1995).
146. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
147. Id. at 67-68.
148. Id. at 81.
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a candidate is most likely to be responsive 49 and "place more precisely
each candidate along the political spectrum.""' "Significantly, the
Buckley Court held that this informational interest" could be just as
strong as the anti-corruption interest, and that disclosure statutes could
be justified by the informational interest when the anti-corruption
interest alone is insufficient."'
In addition to serving a compelling public interest, First Amendment
scrutiny requires that a disclosure statute be narrowly tailored to the
public interest it serves.'52 Accordingly, the Buckley Court carefully
analyzed whether FECA's disclosure provisions were tailored to avoid
unconstitutional vagueness or overbreadth' 53
FECA's original disclosure provisions were, in fact, very broad - and,
in places, very vague. As written, FECA required disclosure of all
independent spending "for the purpose of influencing a federal
election."'' 4 This definition potentially reached an extremely broad range
of political spending - while using the subjective terms "purpose" and
"influence" - some of which might have little or no direct connection to
elections.
To avoid declaring the statute unconstitutionally vague, the Court
applied two "saving" constructions. First, the Court narrowed the
application of the term "political committees" (subject to disclosure
responsibilities) to "organizations that are under the control of a
candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of
a candidate."'55 Second, the Court narrowed the disclosure provisions to.• 156
cover only express advocacy independent expenditures.
149. Id. at 67.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
153. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-80.
154. 2 U.S.C. 434(e) (1994).
155. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79. In FEC v. GOPAC, 917 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1996), the
FEC asked the court of appeals to declare that GOPAC, a political action committee run
by former U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich, was subject to the FECA's disclosure
requirements. Id. at 852. GOPAC argued that it did not fall under the FEC's perview
because its major purpose was to support state and local candidates, not federal
candidates. Id. at 853. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with
GOPAC, finding that, while GOPAC's ultimate and indirect purpose may have been to
help bring about the eventual election of Republicans to Congress, its operational function
was to elect Republicans at the state and local level. Id. at 864. GOPAC wanted to use
these state and local officials as a "farm team" from which to later recruit candidates to
run for Congress, however, that purpose was too indirect and remote to trigger disclosure
obligations FECA. Id. Consequently, the court found that GOPAC was not a federal
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The justices also suggested ways to ensure that a statute was not
overbroad. First, it created small donor and small spender exceptions.'57
Second, the Court said disclosure could be unconstitutional if it would
expose groups or their contributors to threats, harassment, or reprisals.
158
To address this concern, the Court - rather than striking down the
disclosure provisions - created a "hardship exemption" under which
minors and certain others would not have to comply with the disclosure
provisions if they demonstrated a reasonable probability that their
compliance would result in adverse consequences. "9
2. The Legacy of Buckley's Disclosure Framework
The Supreme Court's disclosure jurisprudence since Buckley has
moved in seemingly contradictory directions in recent years. While
several cases subsequent to Buckley have emphasized and expanded the
Court's notion of an "informational interest" favoring disclosure, other
decisions have carved out concrete exemptions from disclosure
requirements. Another recent case, McIntyre v. Ohio Board of
Elections,'6' suggested that the "informational interest" may not be as
compelling as the Buckley Court indicated, at least in certain
circumstances. In First National Bank v. Belloti,161 the justices suggested
that disclosures enable voters to better evaluate the credibility of
political speakers, and the reliability of their statements. Expanding the
scope of their previous "informational interest" rationale, the Court
stated:
The people in our democracy are entrusted with the
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making their
"political committee" supporting federal candidates and, therefore, was not subject to
FECA's disclosure requirements. Id.
156. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76.
157. Id. at 82. The 1974 Act had two thresholds or triggers to determine who had to
make disclosures. Id. First, political committees were required to disclose names and
addresses of persons contributing amounts in excess of $10. Id. at 82. Second, for persons
making aggregate contributions of more than $100, the committees were also required to
disclose the contributors' occupations and places of business. Id. While the Buckley
Court upheld the provisions, it warned that the "thresholds are indeed low." Id. at 83.
Taking its cue from the Court, Congress raised the thresholds to $200 in the 1979
amendments to the FECA. Since then, lower courts have generally upheld even low
thresholds. See, e.g., Or. Socialist Workers 1974 Campaign Comm. v. Paulus, 432 F. Supp.
1255 (D. Ore. 1977) (upholding a disclosure law that had no minimum threshold).
15& Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
159. Id.
160. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
161. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate ....
Identification of the source of advertising may be required as a
means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to evaluate the
arguments to which they are being subjected. 162
Despite this reaffirmation of its respect for broad disclosure, the Court
has been willing to carve out exemptions. Recall that in Buckley, while
the Court upheld FECA's disclosure requirements, 6 1 the justices said
that parties could get an exemption from the rules if they demonstrated a
reasonable probability that disclosure would result in threats,
harassment, and reprisals against members or the organization itself.
164
/ 1 • 165
No plaintiff in Buckley had made such a showing.
Six years after Buckley, however, the Court granted a disclosure
exemption in Brown v. Socialist Workers Party 1974 Campaign
Committee. 66 In Brown, the Court found that the plaintiff Workers Party
met the Buckley hardship test by showing that they had suffered the sort
of threats, harassment, and reprisals Buckley anticipated.67 Specifically,
the Court noted that disclosure of the party's identity in their
advertisements had subjected party members to threatening phone calls,
hate mail, police harassment, FBI surveillance, the firing of gunshots at a
party office, and the dismissal of several party members from their jobs
because of membership.16' Consequently, the Court ordered that they
should be exempted from FECA's disclosure requirements.1 69
In MCFL,7° a non-profit corporation challenged the FEC's
requirement that corporations, including non-profits, must form a PAC
to engage in campaign-related activity." A grassroots pro-life group
contended that the strict accounting, disclosure, and reporting
requirements imposed on PACs were prohibitive for small
162. Id. at 791-92.
163. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84.
164. Id. at 74.
165. Id. at 72, n.88.
166. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
167. Id. at 102.
168. Id. at 99.
169. Id. at 102. Lower courts have likewise ruled certain organizations exempt from
disclosure requirements by reason of harassment, threats, or reprisals. See, e.g., FEC v.
Hall-Tyner Election Campaign Comm., 678 F.2d 416 (1982).
170. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). The MCFL opinion, in addition to its relevance to disclosure
issues discussed here, also upheld the corporate contribution ban. Id. at 259. However,
the opinion also created an exception to that ban for certain non-profit corporations. Id.
It also reaffirmed the Buckley express advocacy ruling, although it broadened that
standard beyond mere "magic words" analysis. Id. at 249.
171. Id. at 252.
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organizations.72 The Supreme Court agreed with MCFL, ruling that
some non-profits, such as MCFL, could engage in campaign activity, even
express advocacy, without having to comply with all PAC disclosure
requirements.'73  The Court emphasized how burdensome the
requirements were when applied to "small groups" whose activities
consist predominantly of grassroots activities such as "garage sales, bake
sales, and raffles."' 4 The Court created a special, narrow exception
under which certain non-profits need only report specific, independent
expenditures, and do not have to comply with FECA's other disclosure
and organizational requirements.' In the lower courts, however, actions
to invalidate disclosure on the basis of regulatory burden have failed
where the party challenging disclosure is a large political organization
such as a national political party or a coalition of television
broadcasters.7 6
However, after two decades of tipping the scale in favor of disclosure
provisions, the Supreme Court showed a new skepticism toward some
disclosure requirements when it decided the 1996 case McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission.'7  In McIntyre, the Court asserted that disclosure
laws were subject to strict scrutiny, and particularly to overbreadth
analysis. '78 The Court stressed, however, that its holding was limited to
disclosures of the type of independent activity pursued by Mrs.
McIntyre.79 "Required disclosures about the level of financial support a
candidate has received from various sources are supported by an interest
in avoiding the appearance of corruption that has no application to this
case.
,,180
172. Id. at 241.
173. Id. at 255.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 265-66. The FEC has codified the MCFL exemption into its regulations. 11
CFR § 114.10 (2000). The Texas Supreme Court recently ruled that a husband and wife
do not have to register and form a political committee in order to make an independent
expenditure, but that they did have to file independent expenditure reports. Osterberg v.
Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 47-48 (Tex., 2000).
176. See, e.g., Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the RNC claims that the FEC's
"best efforts" regulations constituted an undue administrative burden on the RNC. Id. at
409. Analyzing whether compliance with the requirement imposed a severe burden on the
RNC, the court found that the burden was slight and rejected the claim of" undue burden.
Id. at 410; see also Adventure Communications v. Ky. Registry of Election Fin., 191 F.3d
429 (4th Cir. 1999).
177. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
178. Id. at 347.
179. Id. at 354.
180. Id.
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In McIntyre, the Ohio disclosure law at issue required all materials
relating to ballot initiatives or referenda pamphlets to include source
identification disclaimers disclosing the name of the person producing
the literature. 8' The defendant distributed leaflets opposing a school tax
levy, which was an initiative election subject.'2 Some leaflets had no
source identification disclaimer while others included the pseudonymous
disclaimer "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS."' 83 The
Ohio Elections Commission fined the defendant $100 for violating the
source identification disclaimer law. 84
To defend the statute's constitutionality, Ohio asserted public interests
analogous to those approved in Buckley: providing the electorate with
relevant information and preventing fraud and libelous statements."
This time, however, the Court dismissed the informational interest,
stating that few members of the public would know the defendant, and
thus disclosure of her name revealed little.8 The Court also rejected the
anti-fraud/misinformation interest, saying it was duplicative of several
more specific prohibitions in Ohio's Election Code against making or
disseminating false statements during political campaigns.8 Thus, the
Court found the purpose redundant and the statute overbroad and
unconstitutional.188
The McIntyre Court also appeared to enunciate a new, and important,
consideration in disclosure cases: an interest in "anonymous speech," at
least in non-candidate elections. In McIntyre, the Court applied strict
scrutiny and required Ohio to show that the law promoted a compelling
state interest, and that the law was narrowly tailored to suit those
interests 8 The Court weighed two considerations most heavily: the
historical importance of "anonymous speech," as it extolled the role of
such speech in American history,17 and the overbreadth of the Ohio
statute.'9' Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented
181. Id. at 388 n.3 (reciting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (1998)).
182. Id. at 337.
183. Id. at 337 n.2.
184. Id. at 338.
185. Id. at 348.
186. Id. at 348-49.
187. Id. at 349-51.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 346.
190. Id. at 342 (citing famous anonymous works such as the Federalist Papers).
191. Id. at 351-53. Regarding overbreadth, the Court said: .
[Ohio's disclosure law] applies not only to the activities of candidates and their
organized supporters, but also to individuals acting independently and using only
2002]
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from the opinion, contesting the majority's analysis.19  Specifically,
Justice Scalia noted that the anonymous works cited by the majority were
not election-related speech, and that source disclaimer laws have been
presumed constitutional since the nineteenth century. 
93
The lower courts are split on the reach of McIntyre. Several courts
have taken a broad reading of Mclntyre, 94 asserting that the Supreme
Court established a constitutional right to anonymous speech in the
case. In Stewart v. Taylor,"" one federal district court went even
farther, interpreting McIntyre as recognizing a right to engage in
anonymous political speech that extended to candidates engaging in
express advocacy on their own behalf.1
Several other courts have held that McIntyre did not establish a right
to anonymous speech. 19' Instead, these courts argue that it represents a
simple application of the overbreadth analysis to disclosure statutes. In
addition, these courts argue that McIntyre did not fundamentally change
Buckley's disclosure framework and suggest that narrowly-crafted
their own modest resources. It applies not only to elections of public officers, but
also to ballot issues that present neither a substantial risk of libel nor any
potential appearance of corrupt advantage. It applies not only to leaflets
distributed on the eve of an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited,
but also to those distributed months in advance. It applies no matter what the
character or strength of the author's interest in anonymity .... We recognize
that a State's enforcement interest might justify a more limited identification
requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for inhibiting the leafleting at issue
here.
Id. at 353.
192 Id. at 371-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. See, e.g., Webster v. Yes for Life Political Action Comm., 74 F. Supp. 2d 37 (D.
Me. 1999); West Virginias for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 919 F. Supp. 953 (S.D.W. Va. 1996).
195. West Virginians, 919 F. Supp. at 959-60; Webster, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 39-40.
196. 953 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
197. Id. at 1054-55.
198. See, e.g., FEC v. Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d 285, 397-98 (2d Cir. 1995); Ky.
Right to Life v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 648 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Richey v. Tyson, 120 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1310 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (finding that the McIntyre court did not treat issue
advocacy as "automatically beyond the reach of government regulation"); Griset v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 23 P.3d 43 (Cal. 2001); Seymour v. Elections Enforcement
Comm'n, 762 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2594 (2001) (finding that
McIntyre's reach was limited to ballot elections and therefore inapplicable to candidate
elections); Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.2.3d 31, 42 (Tex.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1244 (2000)
(analyzing McIntyre as ruling not that issue advocacy disclsoure is per se unconstitutional,
but simply that disclosure requirements in general may be unconstitutional to the extent
they are overbroad).
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disclosure statutes, including source disclosure laws, could withstand
constitutional scrutiny. '99
In FEC v. Akins&0 the Supreme Court analyzed Buckley and ruled
that private citizens have legal standing to sue the FEC to enforce
FECA's disclosure provisions.01 Akins held that citizens suffer an
informational injury when political groups fail to make disclosures - a
holding which suggests that disclosure's informational interest, seemingly
diminished in McIntyre, still has constitutional merit.
3. The FEC's Response
Enforcing the FECA's disclosure provisions is a multi-faceted process.
First, the FEC may begin an investigation or enforcement action if it has
probable cause, or if a third party files a complaint alleging that a
violation has occurred.03 The FEC's conventional investigation and
enforcement process is time consuming and, historically, disclosure
violations have not been given high priority. M FEC disclosure violations
are prosecuted either by the FEC, pursuant to its civil enforcement
authority,2°5 or, where the violation has the criminal elements of a
199. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
200. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
201. Id. at 19-26.
202. Id. at 20. The Court stated that:
[The citizens'] failure to obtain relevant information ... is injury of a kind that
FECA seeks to address .... The "injury in fact" that respondents have suffered
consists of their inability to obtain information - lists of donors . . . and
campaign-related contributions and expenditures - that, on respondents" view of
the law, the statute requires that [PACs] make public. There is no reason to
doubt their claim that the information would help them (and others to whom
they would communicate it) to evaluate candidates for public office, especially
candidates who received assistance from [PACs], and to evaluate the role that
[PACs"] financial assistance might play in a specific election .... .[The]
informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most basic of
political rights, is sufficient ... to authorize its vindication in the federal courts.
Id. at 20-25.
203. 2 U.S.C. § 437(g). FEC enforcement actions often result from press reports and
scrutiny of disclosure records. The 1996 foreign contributions scandal, for instance, began
not with FEC enforcement action, but because of investigations into FEC reports by the
DNC regarding funds raised from U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies. See Alan C.
Miller, Democrats Return Illegal Contribution; South Korean Subsidiary's $250,000
Donation Violated Ban on Money From Foreign Nationals, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1996, at
A16.
204. FEC Annual Report 2000.
205. 2 U.S.C. § 437g (2000).
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knowing and willful violation, by the Justice Department's Public
Integrity Section or United States Attorneys.
In addition to bringing actions against knowing and willful violations of
FECA provisions, the Justice Department and U.S. Attorneys may
prosecute FECA's disclosure violations under the False Statements
Statute .2 0 The False Statements Act applies to persons with a legal
responsibility to file reports with the government - in the FECA context,
campaign or other political committee treasurers.2 8 Campaign treasurers
are often not the "bad actors" where a disclosure violation is concerned;
rather, the "bad actors" are other campaign officials or contributors.
Prosecutions are often based not only on the False Statement Act, but
also on vicarious culpability, as well as the federal conspiracy statute,209 to
reach persons who conspire with straw donors or others to carry out
schemes that violate disclosure requirements.10
In 2000, Congress established an administrative fine system to provide
an alternative to enforcement of disclosure violations. 1 Under the new
administrative fine program, filers who fail to file or who file late are
automatically fined and given forty days to either pay the penalty or
submit a written response, which would begin a conventional dispute
resolution procedure.12
206. CRAIG C. DONSANTO ET AL., FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES
106 (6th ed. 1995).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing that any person who causes another to commit an
act "which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense.., is punishable
as a principal"). Key cases concerning the False Statements Act as it relates to FECA are
United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1990), and United States v. Hansen, 772
F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
208. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
209. Id. § 371.
210. See, e.g., United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 (D.D.C. 1998). Many of the
prosecutions arising out of the 1996 fundraising scandals were based in part on sections
1001 and 371. Id.
211. From FEC Press Release: "Congress in 1999 authorized the administrative fines
program amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, sec. 309(a)(4), 2 U.S.C.
437g(a)(4). The amendments were enacted as part of the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act, 2000, Public Law 106-58, 106th Congress, Sec. 640, 113
Stat. 430, 476-77 (1999)." FEC, FEC Issues Final Rules on Administrative Fine Procedure
(May 31, 2000), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/AdminFinesFinal.htm. Until
recently, reporting violations such as late filers and failure to file were enforced with the
same enforcement procedures employed for campaign finance violations - i.e. through a
time-consuming investigation or litigation. For an overview of the complaint process, see
http://www.fec.gov/pages/complain.htm (last visited May 9, 2002).
212. 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (2000); 11 C.F.R. § 111.32-35 (2001). Although random audits
were included among the original FECA, Congress repealed the provision. 26 U.S.C. §
9007 (1994). Congress did, however, leave the presidential audits in place. Id. § 9038.
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C. Campaign Contributions
FECA limited political contributions by providing that "no person
shall make contributions to any candidate with respect to any election for
Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000.,,213 FECA further
provided for a $5,000 limit on campaign contributions by political
committees and an "overall $25,000 limitation on total contributions" an
214individual could make during a calendar year. FECA also restricted a
candidate's ability to finance his or her own campaign personally and
created a cap on permissible expenditures by candidates during primary
and general elections.215 The Act also prohibits foreign nationals from
directly or indirectly contributing in any way to state, local, or federal
elections. The FECA defines a foreign national as "an individual who is
not a citizen of the United States and who is not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.... ,,216
1. Buckley v. Valeo: Upholding FECA's Contribution Limits
In Buckley, the Court found that political expenditures and
contributions qualified as political speech governed by the First
Amendment.217 The Court concluded that although both acts were forms
of political speech, they were not entitled to the same degree of
protection.2 18 Thus, the Court struck down limitations on expenditures,
finding that these limits were a substantial restraint on speech.2 '9 The
Court however, upheld FECA's campaign contribution restrictions,
finding that contributions are an indirect expression of support for a
candidate.22°
Moreover, the Court found no evidence that contribution restrictions
had significant, negative implications on First Amendment concerns
prevalent in areas such as issue advocacy and expenditure limitations2 2
Therefore, the Court upheld efforts to restrict campaign contributions
because such efforts only marginally restrict First Amendment rights.22
213. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976).
214. Id. at 35-36, 38.
215. Id. at 51, 54.
216. 2 U.S.C. § 441e (1994).
217. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
218. Id. at 23.
219. Id. at 19.
220. Id. at 21 (noting that "the transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor"). The contributions limits upheld
in Buckley remain in effect today..
221. Id. at 21, 143.
222. Id. at 143.
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Furthermore, the Court held that the campaign contribution limitation
was a narrowly-tailored means to maintain the integrity of the electoral
process, regardless of other laws that aimed to prevent corruption in
campaign funding.2 -
2. The Legacy of Buckley's Campaign Contribution Standard
In California Medical Ass'n v. FEC,22A the Court determined the
validity of a FECA provision that prohibited individuals from
contributing more than $5,000 to a multi-candidate political committee.
2
25
In California Medical, the Court maintained that the restriction was an
unconstitutional expenditure limitation - and thus not merely a
contribution limitation - because it prevented the medical association
from expressing its views through its PAC.2 6  California Medical
Association (CMA) also argued that even if a PAC donation was
properly classified as a contribution, FECA was still unconstitutional
because the donation was internal and not directed outside the
organization .2  Thus, under this reasoning, there was no risk of "actual
or apparent corruption of the political process" because CMA employees
were giving money to their own PAC, not to a candidate for public
office. 2 The Court rejected CMA's characterization of PAC donations
as expenditures rather than contributions, and held that the contribution
limitations were valid.229 Accordingly, as in Buckley, the Court found the
restrictions marginal in scope and appropriate to further the
government's substantial interest.13
Within months of deciding California Medical, the Court considered
the constitutionality of a city ordinance that placed a $250 limit on
individual contributions to "committee[s] formed to support or oppose
223. Id. at 28.
224. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
225. Id. at 185 (referring to 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C)).
226. Id. at 195. In the California Medical Association's view, the PAC was not an
independent organization but rather an integral and invaluable arm of the medical
association through "which CMA has chosen to engage in political speech." Id. at 196.
227. Id. at 196 (noting that funds were not being directed to an entity wholly
independent of CMA, but instead to the PAC formed to pursue its political interests).
228. Id. at 197.
229. Id. at 195-97 (holding that nothing "limits the amount CMA or any of its
members may independently expend in order to advocate political views; rather, the
statute restrains only the amount that CMA may contribute").
230. Id. at 198-99 (reasoning that limitations upon contributions made to PACs are
necessary to prevent individuals and groups from evading other statutory caps on
contributions).
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ballot measures." '  Employing an "exacting judicial review, ''23 the
Court weighed the contributor's constitutional right to free speech
against the government's compelling interest in enacting the ordinance. 33
Unlike California Medical and Buckley, in Citizens Against Rent Control,
the Court concluded that the city's interest was "insubstantial" and that it
did not warrant a restraint on speech.2' The Court stated that
contributions to support or oppose an initiative were much less likely to
lead to corruption than contributions to an individual candidate. 23'
The Court then considered the constitutionality of the party
expenditure provision.26 Under this provision, political parties were
exempt from the $5,000 limit on contributions to political candidates. 237
However, political parties were subject to a limit based on the state's
voting age population. 238 The Colorado Republican Party sought to have
this provision declared unconstitutional.239 A divided Court held that, as
applied, the provision violated the Constitution.m The Court
determined that the provision was not applicable to an independent
expenditure. 241 The impact of the Court's decision was limited because
the Court merely confirmed that political parties were entitled to the
same protection afforded individuals or private groups making
independent expenditures.242
Justice Thomas dissented in the opinion. 243 He argued that the Buckley
framework was deeply flawed, because it failed to recognize that
"[c]ontributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First
Amendment coin." 244 Thomas contended that the difference between
expenditures and contributions is in the form, not the substance, as they
serve to further political debate, discussion, and speech.245 As a result,
231. Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 291 (1981).
232. Id. at 294.
233. Id. at 295-98.
234. Id. at 298-99.
235. Id. at 296-98.
236. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 611, 640-41
(1996).
237. Id. at 610-11.
238. Id. at 611.
239. Id. at 612 (arguing a violation of the First Amendment).
240. Id. at 613.
241. Id. at 614-15.
242. Id. at 618.
243. Id. at 636 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
244. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 241 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
245. Id.
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the distinction lacks constitutional significance because both forms of
campaign spending involve "core First Amendment expression."
246
Four years later, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of campaign contribution
limits and again upheld the restrictions.2 47 A PAC and an individual
seeking state office initiated the suit.2  They challenged the
constitutionality of a Missouri statute that imposed campaign
contribution limitations ranging from $250 to $1,000.249 Although the
district court upheld the statute, finding that the limitations served the
government's interest in preventing voter suspicion and distrust of large
campaign contributions,2° the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the
state failed to prove a compelling state interest.2' Finally, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the "congruence of the Eighth




3. The FEC's Response
The Federal Election Commission's enforcement of contribution limits
is not dissimilar to enforcement of disclosure provisions involving a
lengthy investigation process and the opportunity for civil action on
matters found to be willful violations of the law.253 Unfortunately, as is
the case with matters regarding disclosure and issue advocacy, the FEC is
limited by a structure that makes it ineffectual in the enforcement of law.
The 1996 election cycle saw the broadest-based corruption in politics
since Watergate. President Clinton hosted coffees with large party
donors and opened the Lincoln Bedroom to high bidders in exchange for
soft money donations to the DNC. Political parties held soft-money
fundraisers and shattered all previous fund-raising records. Issue
advocacy campaigns exploded onto the political scene en masse,
spending hundreds of millions of dollars in political advertising. The
public witnessed these fundraising excesses involving foreign money
scandals, fundraisers at Buddhists temples, money laundering, and the
like. The Congress, the FEC, and the Department of Justice all reacted.
246. Id.
247. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 381-82 (2000).
248. Id. at 383. The individual seeking office was Zev David Fredman. Id. He was the
Republican nominee for state auditor in 1998. Id.
249. Id. at 382.
250. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 5 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 161
F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 1998).
251. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519, 521-22 (8th Cir. 1998).
252. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 385.
253. FEC Annual Report 2000, at 10-11.
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A special Senatorial Governmental Affairs Committee chaired by
Senator Fred Thompson (D-TN) reported the abuses of the election
cycle; then-Attorney General Janet Reno established a Campaign
Financing Task Force at the Department of Justice to investigate
allegations of campaign finance abuses. More than twenty-two
individuals have been charged to date, including Charlie Huang and
Maria Hsia, where there were significant findings against them for illegal
activity.24 In contrast to these relatively aggressive governmental
responses to the abuses of the 1996 election cycle, the FEC was, to put it
charitably, passive.
Two examples not yet discussed in this article bare note on the FEC's
failure to react to the activities of the time. Thomas Kramer was a
foreign national barred from making political contributions. In 1994, he
wrote a letter to the FEC vis-A-vis legal counsel voluntarily divulging that
he had contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars that were
presumably illegal during a time when he did not know that the FECA
prohibits contributions by foreign nationals. A few weeks later,
Kramer's counsel sent the FEC a detailed list of the contributions in
question. The FEC ignored the case for nearly two years before deciding
to take action. The FEC finally contacted Kramer in July 1996, and
reached a conciliation agreement soon thereafter. Kramer paid a civil
penalty of $323,000. Twelve months after the FEC reached an
agreement with Kramer, during the 1996 election cycle in the height of
foreign national contributions to the parties, the FEC slowly broadened
its look at this case and began to investigate Howard Glicken, a
fundraiser for Democratic causes who had solicited some of Kramer's
contributions. It was not until June 1997, three years after Kramer's
initial letter, that the FEC subpoenaed the Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee to obtain further information on Glicken and his
activities for the party. There was strong reason to believe that Glicken
intentionally violated the FECA - in fact, he later pleaded guilty to this
allegation in a case brought by the DOJ Campaign Financing Task Force,
but in December 1997, the FEC dismissed the case. The FEC observed
that it was only a few months away from the termination of the five-year
statute that limits the FEC's investigative powers and noted dryly that
the foreign contributions in question were made in old election cycles.
Other investigations ended in like fashion. The second example comes
from a complaint that was issued against the RNC and an affiliated not-
254. Department of Justice Press Release, Attorney General Reno Names New Head
of Campaign Financing Task Force (Dec. 27, 1999).
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for-profit, National Policy Forum (NPF). The charge was filed by the
DNC and claimed that the NPF was not separate, but a wing of the RNC
and was used to launder foreign money into the RNC. The general
counsel recommended that the Commission pursue the case and find
probable cause that the RNC and Haley Barbour, its chairman, solicited
and received $1.6 million from foreign national sources. The three
Republican commissioners voted against the general counsel's
recommendation and the three Democratic commissioners voted for it.
The matter died in deadlock and was closed without action.
In March 2000, the FEC released its annual legislative
recommendations to Congress. The Commission included a
recommendation that the statute regarding foreign nationals be clarified
to ban foreign contributions and expenditures being made in relation to
any federal state or local election. The Washington Post and others
argued that this was the first time the law was being made a priority by
the FEC.55
II. CONCLUSION
Neither Congress nor the FEC should be unnecessarily reticent about
enacting, implementing, and enforcing campaign finance laws and
regulations out of a fear that the Supreme Court ultimately will strike
down their efforts. Rather, the Supreme Court has sustained most such
endeavors by concluding that campaign finance laws serve compelling
government interests sufficient to justify any constitutional concerns. In
the rare event that a law or regulation is found to improperly infringe on
the First Amendment, the Court has demonstrated a willingness to
narrowly construe the offending provisions in order to uphold as much of
the law as possible. Accordingly, modest campaign finance reforms -
such as the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which was built
upon existing constitutional precedents and recent Supreme Court
opinions as outlined above - should be upheld in any constitutional
challenges as serving the "weighty" government interests of preventing
both the appearance and reality of government corruption.
255. Washington in Brief: FEC Urges Tougher Law Banning Foreign Donations,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2000, at A20.
[Vol. 51:839
